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Abstract. 
This study explores managerial learning from social capital during internationalization. Its 
two research questions are these: (1) how different managers perceive, interpret, and respond to 
foreign-market institutions, and (2) how connections, relations, and cognition enhance 
managerial learning. Using an interpretive approach, the study analyzes patterns of 
internationalization and strategic decision-making in four contrasting Norwegian case 
companies that internationalize to the Russian oil and gas market. The findings show that the 
managers of the case companies hold similar perceptions about foreign-market institutions, but 
that they interpret and respond to those institutions from various levels of learning, resulting in 
different enactment on institutions. Managers learning at a “higher” level adapt patterns and 
decisions to ensure institutional conformity, while those at a “lower” level makes minor 
adjustments in patterns and behavior only when necessary and therefore maintain institutional 
conflict. Further, the findings show that all three dimensions of social capital have a vital role 
in enhancing managerial learning, but that the various forms that the dimensions can appear as, 
affects the learning process. Furthermore, the findings show that managers who share cognitive 
frame of reference with few embedded relationships are better equipped to interpret and 
respond to institutions. This study contributes fresh insight about managerial enactment on 
foreign-market institutions, and reconciles our understanding about social capital as embraced 
by the structural, relational, and cognitive dimensions. This study also contributes to a greater 
understanding about how the three dimensions of social capital ought to be formed to enhance 
managerial learning. 
Keywords: Social capital; organizational learning; internationalization; foreign-market 
institutions; subsidiary; Russia 




Recent research about companies’ internationalization process—specifically, when 
managers face ambiguity and dissonance because of unfamiliar foreign-market institutions—
has emphasized the relevance of managerial learning about institutions from one’s social 
capital (e.g., Collins & Hitt 2006; Dhanaraj, Lyles, & Steensma 2004; Griffith, Zeybek, & 
O`Brien 2001; Hau & Evangelista 2007; Shi et al. 2014). Here, “learning” deals with how 
managers acquire and assimilate knowledge about foreign-market institutions, as well as how 
managers perceive, interpret, and respond to institutions (Daft & Weick 1984; Fiol 1994; Huber 
1991). According to normative theory, this learning process can occur at a high or low level 
(Fiol and Lyles 1985; Hedberg 1981). At a “lower level,” managers have no intention of 
making changes in their familiar behavior to confirm to expectations of institutions in the 
foreign market, and therefore maintain institutional conflict. At a “higher level,” managers 
make profound changes in their behavior to expectations of foreign-market institutions, and 
therefore ensure institutional conformity. 
Accordingly, many scholars have studied how the managerial learning process unfolds 
during internationalization to foreign markets with unfamiliar institutions and how social 
capital can foster learning (Lindstrand, Melèn, & Nordman 2011; Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998; 
Presutti, Boari, & Fratocchi 2007). 
“Social capital” speaks to all resources, including knowledge about foreign-market 
institutions and insight about appropriate patterns of internationalization and strategic decision-
making, that can be gained through rich social networking with relations in the foreign market 
and a shared cognitive frame of reference with these relations. Building on an early 
conceptualization of social capital by Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998), scholars have created a 
growing literature about how managers invest in the structural, relational, and cognitive 
dimensions of social capital, and in what form these dimensions should appear to enhance 
learning during internationalization (Lindstrand, Melèn, & Nordman 2011; Presutti, Boari, & 
Fratocchi 2007). But within this literature, many scholars tend to focus on only two of the three 
dimensions. For instance, whereas some scholars have studied just the structural and relational 
dimensions (Moran 2005; Koka & Prescott 2002; Rowley, Behrens, & Krackhardt 2000; Yli-
Renko, Autio & Tontti 2002), others have studied just the relational and cognitive ones 
(Coeurderoy et al. 2012; Eriksson & Chetty 2003; Lane, Salk & Lyles 2001). 
The literature also offers us inconsistent findings about how the three dimensions of social 
capital ought to be formed to foster learning. There is no consensus yet on whether managers 
ought to build connections in the foreign market with links to governing bodies and authorities, 
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or whether they ought instead to build bridges or bonds with key business managers in the 
foreign market to enhance learning (Jansson & Sandberg 2008; Sandberg 2013; Shi et al. 2014). 
Further, there is conflicting evidence as to whether learning is enhanced through arms-length 
relations or, instead, through embedded relationships with the managers’ connections in the 
foreign market (Dhanaraj, Lyles, & Steensma 2004; Griffith, Zeybek, & O`Brien 2001; Hau & 
Evangelista 2007). Finally, the studies also disagree as to whether managers ought to ensure 
cognitive resonance toward foreign-market institutions, where managers’ interpretation and 
response to institutions are in line with the cognitive frame of reference of their connections in 
the foreign market (Minbaeva et al. 2002; Zahra & Hayton 2008; Wu & Voss 2015). Or whether 
managers can maintain cognitive dissonance, so that their interpretation and response toward 
institutions are rooted in their familiar cognitive frame of reference embedded in their home 
market. 
Given all this inconsistency, there is a need to reconcile a proper conceptualization of the 
three dimensions of social capital, and also to clarify the appropriate forms of those dimensions 
so as to best foster managerial learning during internationalization (Adler & Kwon 2002; Koka 
& Prescott 2002). 
Studies on this topic have also mainly addressed how managers acquire and assimilate 
knowledge about foreign-market institutions, but provide few insights into exactly how they 
interpret and respond to that knowledge. Therefore, we need to enhance our understanding of 
how knowledge turns into active learning—that is, when managers actually change patterns of 
internationalization and adapt strategic decisions to ensure institutional conformity (Dimitratos 
et al. 2014; Engelhard & Nägele 2003; Hau & Evangelista 2007; Mu, Gnyawali & Hatfield 
2007; Saka-Helmhout 2007). 
I aim here to provide a better understanding of how the managerial learning process unfolds 
during internationalization when challenged by foreign-market institutions and how managers’ 
investment in social capital can enhance learning. More specifically, I will explore two research 
questions: (1) how different managers perceive, interpret, and respond to foreign-market 
institutions, and (2) how connections, relations, and cognition enhance managerial learning. My 
analysis is based on two theoretical perspectives. First, I investigate the managerial learning 
process by analyzing how different managers perceive, interpret, and respond (Daft & Weick 
1984; Fiol 1994; Hedberg 1981; Huber 1991) to foreign-market institutions, and whether this 
learning process occurs at a “higher” or “lower” level of learning as this directs different 
enactment toward foreign institutions (Hedberg 1981; Fiol & Lyles 1985). Second, I investigate 
how social capital can foster learning by analyzing how the constellation of the structural (Burt, 
4 
 
1992; Granovetter 1973; Gittell & Vidal 1998), relational (Polanyi 1966; Powell, 1990; Ussi 
1997), and cognitive (Berger & Luckmann 1966; Bruner 1991; Bruner 1998; Pondy & Mitroff 
1979) dimensions of social capital has been formed, as this directs different opportunities for 
learning about foreign-market institutions (Burt 1992; Granovetter 1992; Nahapiet & Ghoshal 
1998; Putnam 1995). 
Using an interpretive approach, I have studied managerial learning from social capital in 
four contrasting cases.  Each case focuses, in turn, on the internationalization process lead by a 
manager of some Norwegian company that invests in the Russian market. Thus, investigating 
managers that faces all the challenges of dealing with unfamiliar institutions and business 
culture, with their dauntingly alien norms (Bourmistrov & Mineev 2010; Ghauri & Holstius 
1996; Hilmersson & Jansson 2012; Katsioloudes & Isichenko 2007).  What these four cases 
have in common is that each is a Norwegian supply company that has established a foreign 
subsidiary in the Russian oil and gas market. 
Overall, my findings contribute to the research literature on managerial learning from social 
capital during internationalization (Lindstrand, Melèn, & Nordman 2011; Nahapiet and 
Ghoshal 1998; Presutti, Boari, & Fratocchi 2007). Specifically, I offer fresh insight into 
managerial enactment on perceptions on foreign-market institutions, for previous studies 
mainly focus on how managers acquire knowledge about institutions, meanwhile largely 
ignoring how they interpret and respond to the knowledge they have acquired. Second, I 
reconcile an understanding about social capital as consisting of the structural, relational, and 
cognitive dimensions, as most previous studies focus on only two of these dimensions. Third, I 
further develop our understanding of what forms these three dimensions ought to appear to 
enhance managerial learning during internationalization, as previous studies offer divergent 
findings about appropriate forms of the dimensions. 
In what follows, I will offer a conceptual framework about organizational learning during 
internationalization and how learning can occur from all three dimensions of social capital. I 
will then lay out my research methodology, followed by empirical findings that are presented in 
the form of descriptive narratives. Next, I will discuss my findings as they relate to the state of 
knowledge in the research literature. Finally, I will draw some conclusions from my main 
findings and outline some limitations of my study. 
 
2. Theoretical background 
The various beliefs and assumptions about prevailing regulative, normative, and cultural 
institutions in a market guide accepted principles for behavior (Scott 2003). Institutional logic 
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about accepted behavior is rooted in a market’s history of culture, politics, and economy. As the 
history of markets differs, there are multiple logics about appropriate behavior, depending on 
the market in focus. When managers internationalize to markets based on different logics, they 
experience a distance between home and foreign-market institutions (Kostova 1999; Kostova & 
Zaheer 1999; Zaheer & Mosakowski 1997). The greater the perception of “institutional 
distance,” the more challenges managers encounter in making sense of ambiguity and 
dissonance about appropriate behavior. Institutional theory assumes that managers need to 
adapt and conform to the institutional context of a market to survive (DiMaggio & Meyer 1983; 
Meyer & Rowan 1977; Scott 2003). 
Here, I want to discuss how theories about organizational learning can help explain how 
managers act on perceptions about institutional distance to ensure conformity (Dimitratos et al. 
2014; Hau & Evangelista 2007; Mu, Gnyawali & Hatfield 2007), and how managers’ social 
capital can foster learning during internationalization (Lindstrand, Melèn & Nordman 2011; 
Presutti, Boari & Fratocchi 2007; Yli-Renko, Autio, & Sapienza 2001). 
The theoretical assumptions underpinning this study depart from the idea that institutional 
logic in a market guides accepted principles of behavior, and that regulative, normative, and 
cognitive institutions in a market shape appropriate internationalization. When managers 
encounter unfamiliar foreign-market institutions during internationalization, they experience 
ambiguity and dissonance in appropriate behavior and patterns of internationalization. It 
therefore becomes important to learn about foreign-market institutions, to reduce ambiguity and 
dissonance, and to successfully enter and operate in a market with “distant institutions.” But 
learning becomes challenging because of the unfamiliarity. In addition, I build on the idea that 
institutions are constructed in a social context, so that managers’ connections, relations, and 
shared cognition in the foreign market can be a source to foster greater learning during 
institutional distance. Finally, I build on the idea that learning occurs, for better or worse, when 
managers make changes in behavior—ideally those changes that build institutional conformity 
toward foreign-market institutions. These theoretical assumptions are further outlined in the 
following paragraphs to define a theoretical conceptualization and analytical categories. 
 
2.1. Learning during internationalization 
Theories about organizational learning address the ongoing managerial learning process—
specifically, how managers best improve their knowledge base and how they act on knowledge 
to enhance their performance. (See Figure 1.) Managerial learning involves acquiring 
information about the company’s surroundings and drawing sensible inferences from that 
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information. It further involves managers’ ability to integrate new understandings about their 
surroundings into existing beliefs by reorganizing and restructuring their current knowledge 
base. When managers make changes in patterns of behavior to ensure fit and consistency with 
their surroundings, learning occurs at a higher-order (Daft & Weick 1984; Fiol 1994; Hedberg 
1981; Huber 1991). 
 
Figure 1: The managerial learning process 
 
The importance of organizational learning during internationalization is widely accepted in 
the literature. But Saka-Helmhout (2007) criticized the fact that most studies simplistically 
equate organizational learning with knowledge acquisition, quite ignoring how that knowledge 
is incorporated into managerial actions. Previous studies that have investigated the role of 
social capital during internationalization have similarly focused just on knowledge acquisition, 
thus providing little insight as to how social capital can foster organizational learning (e.g., Yli-
Renko, Autio, & Sapienza 2001). 
One can also question whether previous studies, while purporting to investigate knowledge 
acquisition, have actually offered useful insight into how information is processed into 
knowledge. This question is germane, as organizational learning theories clearly distinguish 
between mere information and knowledge (Wiig 1997; Newell, 1990). Whereas possessing 
information about certain conditions is the state of knowing something, having knowledge 
about conditions is the state of drawing interferences and intelligence about what is known 
(Daft & Weick 1984; Huber 1991). 
So in this paper, instead of addressing just the initial stage of knowledge acquisition, I seek 
to offer perspectives on how managers differently perceive, interpret, and respond to foreign-
market knowledge by illuminating the whole managerial learning process (Daft & Weick 1984; 
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Fiol 1994; Hedberg 1981; Huber 1991). With this approach, I seek to further develop 
perspectives on how managers make sense of what is known, and how they utilize their wisdom 
for commercial ends. 
Theorization about various levels of learning has been given different constructs in previous 
studies, but all of these explain the learning process and the way it guides managerial actions in 
the same manner. A study by Engelhard and Nägele (2007) assigned the various levels of 
learning the typologies “single” and “double-loop” learning by building on the earlier 
conceptualizations of Argyris and Schön`s (1978). Dimitratos, Plakoyiannaki, and Thanos 
(2014), themselves building on the conceptualization “exploration and exploitation” of March 
(1991), assigned to the various levels of learning the typologies “managerial” and 
“entrepreneurial” learning. Pellegrino and McNaughton (2017) also built on March (1991), but 
applied in their study the typologies “congenital” and “experiential” learning. In this paper, I 
build on Saka-Helmhout (2007), who conceptualized how learning can occur at a higher or 
lower level by building on the normative construct by Hedberg (1981) and Fiol and Lyles 
(1985). 
An early study by Schroder, Driver, and Streufert (1967) demonstrated how managers can 
interpret and respond differently to identical information and experiences in their surroundings. 
In complex surroundings, interpretation and response are apt to occur from either a fixed, 
routine-based approach or a flexible, nonroutine-based approach. By building on Schroder, 
Driver, and Streufert (1967), Hedberg (1981) found that different approaches to interpretation 
and response imply various levels of learning, ranging from lower-level to higher-level. Fiol 
and Lyles (1985) later advanced these typologies by also incorporating the conceptualization 
about single- and double-loop learning that was developed by Argyris and Schön (1978). 
At lower-level learning, managers judge everything in their surroundings through the lens of 
their own convictions and prior experiences of appropriateness. They typically have a fixed 
system of norms and rules which they never question. So when changes in behavior are made, 
those changes amount to rarely more than adjustments in organizational peculiarities that affect 
only minor parts of the company. Such responses are invariably rudimentary and temporary, 
aimed at narrow behavioral and performance outcomes, with the actual goal being to maintain 
things pretty much as usual. 
At higher-level learning, meanwhile, managers perceive experiences from multiple 
perspectives that are not limited by their own convictions, since they are receptive to new 
understandings and have few predefined expectations. In fact, they are okay with questioning 
the appropriateness of their own norms and rules. Such managers respond to experience by 
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altering their behavior in response to a new understanding of their surroundings. This often 
makes for profound changes, and those changes can affect the whole company. Managers 
respond heuristically in behavioral changes with the aim of modifying fundamental norms and 
rules embedded in the company for the long term. 
In table 1, I summarize the key features of the lower and higher levels of learning, and 
explain the different learning foci in terms of how managers perceive, interpret, and respond to 
experiences of their surroundings and the underlying aim of their response. The table is based 
on the normative theorization of these concepts by Hedberg (1981) and Fiol and Lyles (1985). 
These concepts are applied as analytical categories in the study I have conducted, when 
analyzing managers’ perceptions, interpretations, and responses to foreign-market institutions.  
Learning foci Lower-level learning Higher-level learning 
Perception • Identify and perceive experiences 
from own conviction. 
• Identify and perceive experiences 
from previous experiences and 
expectations. 
• Identify and perceive experience from 
multiple perspectives. 
• Identify and perceive experiences 
from new realizations with little 
predefined expectations. 
Interpretation • Interpret experiences within a 
fixed system of norms and rules. 
• Interpret experiences within 
existing convictions. 
• Fixed system of convictions is not 
questioned, experiences are. 
• Interpret experiences with reflexivity. 
• Experiences are viewed from several 
alternative explanations. 
• Convicted norms and rules are 
questioned for their appropriateness. 
Respond • Respond to experiences from own 
convictions as a repetition. 
• Adjust organizational peculiarities 
that affect minor parts of the 
company. 
• Responses are rudimentary and 
temporary. 
• Respond to experiences by changing 
fixed system of norms and rules. 
• Respond from a new understanding 
about their surroundings, affecting the 
whole company. 
• Heuristic long duration and long-
lasting response to experiences. 
Aim • Changes for narrow behavioral or 
performance outcomes. 
• Maintain operations as usual. 
• Changes for modifying fundamental 
norms and rules. 
• Changes for long-term duration. 
 
Table 1: Perception, interpretation and respond to experiences on a lower and higher level of 
learning. 
  
Saka-Helmhout (2007) found variations in the level of learning by subsidiaries of the same 
multinational company (MNC), depending on how the different subsidiaries acted on the 
knowledge flow between, and from, the headquarters in the home market. With similar 
headquarters constraints, and embedded ideas about appropriate organization and routines, the 
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subsidiaries had the same basis of pressure. One of the multinational companies studied was 
found to put intense pressure on the subsidiaries to enforce similar ideas to those of the 
headquarters. But some of the subsidiaries of this MNC behaved proactively by adjusting 
organization and routines to adapt to the institutional context of the foreign market, 
demonstrating a higher level of learning. The other multinational company in that study enabled 
its subsidiaries to adapt headquarters’ ideas to the foreign market. But some of the subsidiaries 
of this MNC behaved reactively at a lower level of learning by reinforcing knowledge about 
appropriate organization and routines already existing at the headquarters. 
Dimitratos, Plakoyiannaki, Thanos, and Förbom (2014) also found variations in subsidiaries’ 
level of learning, which they explained by the subsidiaries’ embeddedness in either the foreign 
market or the headquarters. Subsidiaries that were highly embedded at the headquarters with a 
clear corporate mandate and with little decision-making authority learned at a lower level. 
Subsidiaries with high embeddedness in the foreign market and with the autonomy to act and 
make decisions learned at a higher level. An earlier study by Mu, Gnyawali, and Hatfield 
(2007) also demonstrated that subsidiaries’ embeddedness in the foreign market fosters a higher 
level of learning, as these subsidiaries have more awareness, motivation, and intention for 
making sense of the foreign market. 
In the same vein, Hau and Evangelista (2007) showed variations in learning intent by joint 
ventures, arguing that a strong learning intent by managers fosters better and faster learning and 
that managers with high learning capability are better equipped to interpret and integrate new 
knowledge into existing beliefs (Engelhard & Nägele 2003; Hamel 1991; Minbaeva et al. 2002; 
Tsang 1999). The study further found that learning intent must be integrated at both the 
individual and organizational level. At the individual level, those employees involved in 
internationalization and who interact with connections and relations in the foreign market must 
have a positive attitude toward learning. At the organizational level, there must be some pre-
defined learning objectives that create a learning environment and that guide individuals’ 
learning intent. Liu, Ghauri, and Sinkovics (2010) showed similar findings, and added that 
knowledge acquired at the individual level must be disseminated at the organizational level for 
the learning effect to be maximized and not limited to a few individuals in the company. 
In this study, I depart from these empirical discussions when analyzing how managers 
perceive, interpret, and respond to foreign-market institutions during internationalization. I will 
now outline a conceptualization of social capital and discuss empirical findings about how 




2.2. Social capital. 
 “Social capital” consists of resources arising from managers’ connections in a network 
structure, their relationships with connections, and the relations’ shared cognitive frame of 
reference (Burt 1992; Granovetter 1992; Nahapiet & Ghoshal 1998; Putnam 1995). Nahapiet 
and Ghoshal (1998) build on earlier normative literature when defining three distinct but 
interrelated dimensions to the concept of social capital: the structural, relational, and cognitive 
dimensions. 
But as I mentioned in the introduction, empirical research about learning from social capital 
has assigned various dimensions to the concept of social capital, although the main reference is 
Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998). Whereas some studies include only the structural and relational 
dimension (Moran 2005; Koka & Prescott 2002; Rowley, Behrens, & Krackhardt 2000; Yli-
Renko, Autio & Tontti 2002), others include the relational and cognitive dimension 
(Coeurderoy et al. 2012; Eriksson & Chetty 2003; Lane, Salk, & Lyles 2001). Yet still others 
have assigned to social capital either a structural and resource dimension (Agndal, Chetty, & 
Wilson 2008; Ebers & Maurer 2014) or a structural, relational, and resource dimension (Castro 
& Roldán 2013; Yli-Renko, Autio & Sapienza 2001). 
Nevertheless, since most of previous studies emphasize the dimensions assigned by 
Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998), either collectively or individually, I seek here to further develop 
an understanding of social capital as an interrelation between the structural, relational, and 
cognitive dimensions. 
Those three dimensions can occur in different constellations, as illustrated in Table 2. I will 
now define the various dimensions of social capital, then discuss the empirical evidence 
regarding how it can facilitate learning during internationalization. 
Table 2: Three dimensions of social capital and its different forms. 
 
2.2.1 Structural dimension 
The structural dimension of social capital involves managers’ connections in a network 
structure—namely, with whom one is connected and how the constellation of connections is 
constructed (Burt 1992; Granovetter 1992; Nahapiet & Ghoshal 1998). The constellation can be 
Dimensions of             
social capital  
Different forms of the dimensions 
Structural dimension Bridging  Bonding 
Relational dimension Arms-length relations  Embedded relations 




formed by bonding, bridging, or linking connections (Granovetter 1973; Gittell & Vidal 1998). 
Bonding indicates frequent interaction between connections with shared identities and 
emotional closeness that over time build mutual trust, dependency, and reciprocity. The 
interaction over time between these connections builds tightly coupled connections that form 
dense network clusters. Bridging refers to connections that span dense network clusters that 
otherwise are disconnected, forming sparse network clusters. Sparse connections indicate 
irregular and sporadic interaction between loosely coupled connections, and the absence of 
shared identity and emotional closeness. 
Whereas bonds and bridges are horizontal connections between people sharing an interest 
and purpose in business, linking refers to vertical connections between representatives of 
companies and representatives in the public sector and in governmental bodies and authorities 
(Adler & Kwon 2002; Hitt, Lee & Yucel 2002). Linking refers to connections created with 
bureaucrats, politicians, and political parties that have the authority and power to influence the 
activities and resources of a company through governance, policies, and grants. Linking also 
encompasses connections with public services such as municipality administration, border 
customs, and infrastructure services that may have facilities to ease business processes and 
approve business activities. Linked connections also have sporadic interactions and are loosely 
coupled through sparse network clusters. 
 
2.2.2. Relational dimension. 
Whereas the structural dimension of social capital concentrates on impersonal connections 
and network configurations, the relational dimension is concerned with the interpersonal 
relationship between connections (Granovetter 1992; Nahapiet & Ghoshal 1998; Moran 2005). 
Interpersonal relationships can be arrayed on a continuum of relations, with arms-length 
relationships on one end and embedded relationships on the other (Polanyi 1966; Powell, 1990; 
Ussi 1997). 
Arms-length relationships are created mainly for conducting transactions of commodities 
with relations that have limited personal involvement and no intentions of future obligations or 
commitment. These forms of relations are associated with managers who are motivated by self-
interested, short-term, and profit-seeking behavior. A premise for such transactions is that 
managers hold complete information about the foreign market, which neglect the dynamics and 
complexity in markets that can influence exchange. 
On the other continuum, embedded relationships entail sequential transactions and 
interaction between relations, where those relationships matter to such an extent that they are 
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defined as a commodity. These relationships require great effort and time to establish and 
maintain, and are therefore intended to be long-lasting, carrying expectations of obligation and 
commitment to one another with norms of reciprocity. Managers associated with such 
embedded relationships have both altruistic motives and a long-term, profit-seeking 
perspective. Information in such transactions is expected to be available through structures of 
relationships and is exchanged in a changing and complex market. 
 
2.2.3. Cognitive dimension. 
The cognitive dimension of social capital is a rather abstract construct rooted in an 
epistemological concern about the nature of knowledge. By building on the assumption of a 
socially constructed reality (Berger & Luckmann 1966), Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) expect 
that shared language (Pondy & Mitroff 1979) and narratives (Bruner 1991; Bruner 1998) 
between relations in a market facilitate exchange and transfer of knowledge. Unlike the 
impersonal and interpersonal focus in the structural and relational dimension, the cognitive 
dimension is grounded on intersubjectivity based on relations’ shared cognitive frame of 
reference with a common consensus about meaning attachment to certain experiences in the 
market and appropriate behavior. 
A shared cognitive frame of reference is expected to enhance managers’ access to 
knowledge and their interpretation of, and response to, knowledge in accordance with what is 
perceived to be the objective understanding in a particular market, thereby ensuring cognitive 
resonance (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Pondy & Mitroff 1979). When the frame of reference 
differs between relations in a market, cognitive dissonance and conflict restrict access to 
knowledge and limit managers’ ability to interpret and respond to knowledge in its context, 
since they apply another set of meaning constructions to experiences and behavior (Nahapiet & 
Ghoshal 1998). 
 
2.2.4. Learning from social capital 
As already emphasized, research that has investigated learning from social capital has 
limited its perspective to knowledge acquisition, and therefore provides scant insight into how 
acquired knowledge is made sense of and applied by changing behavior and adapting decisions. 
Nevertheless, in this study I build on the existing literature that has enhanced our understanding 
about how social capital can foster knowledge acquisition, while attempting to develop further 




Nonetheless, previous studies have demonstrated different findings about the interrelation 
between the three dimensions of social capital and the appropriate forms of these dimensions 
for acquiring knowledge (Lindstrand, Melèn, & Nordman 2011; Presutti, Boari, & Fratocchi 
2007). The latter trio studied how social capital can be a source for knowledge acquisition in 
start-up companies when entering foreign markets. Their findings demonstrated that the 
structural dimension of social capital is particularly important for knowledge acquisition. They 
argued that managers ought to develop weak ties by bridging connections with a breadth of 
foreign customers to enhance knowledge acquisition. Embedded relationships and shared 
cognition were found to constrain knowledge acquisition, since trust-based relations reduce 
managers’ incentives to search for new knowledge. Instead, they rely on the knowledge 
possessed by their relations, thus creating information redundancy.  
These findings align with an earlier study by Yli-Renko, Autio, and Sapienza (2001) that 
investigated knowledge acquisition from the structural and relational dimension. These authors 
argued that embedded relationships and shared cognition reduce the need for monitoring the 
market and that managers fall into a state of expecting knowledge to be provided when needed, 
with little effort to search for new knowledge themselves. 
Lindstrand, Melèn, and Nordman (2011) showed contrasting findings in their study about 
social capital as a source for knowledge acquisition, together with a perspective on social 
capital as a source for raising financial resources. Their findings demonstrated that the 
structural dimension of social capital is fundamental for both acquiring knowledge and 
finances, but that connections in a network are not enough. The authors argued that managers 
also need to develop trust-based relationships through frequent interactions with connections 
that share frames of reference and experience with similar working background. 
Previous studies that have investigated the interaction between the structural and relational 
dimension of social capital demonstrate similar findings, namely, that embedded relationships 
are important to the acquisition of knowledge about foreign markets (Collins & Hitt 2006; 
Dhanaraj, Lyles & Steensma 2004; Hau & Evangelista 2007; Moran 2005). These studies 
argued that embedded relationships based on principles of reciprocity increase interaction 
between connections that motivates knowledge transfer (Dhanaraj, Lyles & Steensma 2004; 
Griffith, Zeybek & O`Brien 2001; Hau & Evangelista 2007; Liu, Ghauri & Sinkovics 2010). In 
the same vein, some studies have argued that managers often enter strategic alliances and joint 
ventures in foreign markets to develop embedded relationships, believing that such relations 
facilitate knowledge transfer (Dhanaraj, Lyles, & Steensma 2004; Griffith, Zeybek, & O´Brien, 
2001; Liu, Ghauri, & Sinkovics 2010). 
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A 2012 study by Coeurderoy, Cowling, Licht, and Murray, which investigated the 
interaction between the relational and cognitive dimensions of social capital, found that 
relations are important because one can learn from observations and transfer of knowledge 
from more experienced companies in the market. They further found that absorptive capacity—
the ability to recognize and assimilate valuable knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal 1990)—
enhances companies’ likelihood of survival in a foreign market. Earlier studies by Lane, Salk, 
and Lyles (2001) and Eriksson and Chetty (2003) also found that strong relations with few 
connections in the foreign market enhance learning, and that absorptive capacity is 
strengthened through relationships with connections in the market. 
Discussions in the previous paragraphs reveal that the empirical literature has assigned 
different dimensions to the concept of social capital and demonstrate conflicting findings about 
the role of each dimension and their interrelation to enhance organizational learning. I build on 
this stream of research when analyzing how social capital can enhance organizational learning 
during internationalization by applying the structural, relational, and cognitive dimensions as 
analytical categories. I will now elaborate on these analytical categories and provide a more 
overarching outline of the method I employed in this study. 
 
3. Method 
I have taken an interpretive approach to explore how managerial learning evolves during 
internationalization and how social capital can foster learning. This approach has let me 
illuminate managerial interpretations and meaning attachment to this phenomenon, providing 
descriptions from the viewpoint of subjective experiences (Stake 1995; Van Maanen 1979; 
Welch et al. 2011). The phenomenon was studied in close relation to the contextual setting, by 
placing emphasis on peculiarities of context that could constrain or endorse learning (Stake, 
1995; Vaivio 2007). As the study investigates learning from social capital when 
internationalizing to institutionally distant markets, theorization is limited to the context of 
institutional distance (Vaivio 2007). 
This context is explored with empirical evidence from Norwegian managers that 
internationalize into the Russian market. Research literature has for many years shown that 
Norwegian managers experience challenges when expanding into the Russian market, 
particularly because of these markets’ different logic about rules, norms, and culture 
(Bourmistrov & Mineev 2010; Ghauri & Holstius 1996; Hilmersson & Jansson. 2012; 
Katsioloudes & Isichenko 2007), making this an appropriate example to use when investigating 
organizational learning when constrained by foreign market institutions. 
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3.1. Case sampling 
In line with calls for more research that consider context as sensitive (Poulis, Polius, & 
Plakoyiannaki 2013), I have emphasized the uniqueness of the context in the methodological 
decisions (Ghauri 2004; Welch et al. 2011). I conducted a multiple case study to provide in-
depth knowledge about the phenomenon in its context, and to draw inferences about the 
phenomenon from similarities and differences between the subjective experiences in the 
multiple cases (Tsang 2013; Yin 2014). 
Cases were selected with a purposive sampling approach, aiming for maximum variation 
between companies’ abilities for learning. The sampling approach was conducted in two steps. 
The first step was mainly driven by empirical concerns; the second was theoretically driven. 
Initially, I used three criteria to identify a population of potential cases that operated in the 
Russian market. Then I used two criteria to sample companies with maximum variation in 
learning ability. My identification of potential cases was based on the following three criteria 
and their rationale. 
First, the company should offer complex solutions and products to the upstream oil and gas 
market. Such solutions and products require greater involvement with customers for unique 
deliveries extending over a long time-period than the companies offering services, like data-
driven solutions and software, that require little involvement and less time. 
Second, the company should offer solutions and products to field development of oil and gas 
projects. Such solutions require greater integration with other suppliers to a field than solutions 
and products that are delivered earlier or later in the value chain of oil and gas. 
Third, the company should have a direct investment in the Russian market. Foreign direct 
investments require greater resource commitment with a local presence that imposes excessive 
costs and greater risks, compared to simply exporting products to the foreign market 
(Hollender, Zapkau & Schwens 2017; Pan & Tse 2000). These companies also have better 
premises for acquiring foreign-market knowledge and abilities for integrating knowledge and 
changing behavior to meet the expectations of the foreign market (Hollender, Zapkau & 
Schwens 2017; Pan & Tse 2000). 
These criteria included companies with similar contextual background and with the same 
degree of involvement in, and commitment to, the Russian market. I therefore assume that the 
populations of such companies share a similar understanding about prevailing institutions and 
principles for behavior in the home market, and also encounter similar distance in institutions 
when expanding into the Russian market. 
The first step in the case sampling resulted in twelve companies that met my three criteria. 
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These companies were chosen out of the 2,000 companies that constitute the Norwegian supply 
industry to oil and gas activities (Norwegian Petroleum Agency, 2012). My sampling of these 
companies was based on interviews with Norwegian trade organizations and by searching 
through their free-accessed databases (Presutti, Boari & Fratocchi 2007). My interviews with 
respondents from the Norwegian-Russian Chamber of Commerce, Norwegian Energy Partners, 
and Credit guarantee for Norwegian export companies, ensured a clear overview of companies 
with foreign direct investment in Russia. The databases provided a full overview of the various 
supply companies, the products and services they offered, and at what stage of the value chain 
they delivered. To ensure accuracy, I conducted phone interviews with any companies that had 
me questioning whether they actually met my criteria, such as companies with investments in 
the market but with no activities or companies that were on their way to exit the market. 
The final sampling of cases was based on two main criteria to ensure differences in 
organizational conditions that could influence variations in learning ability, based on previous 
empirical research findings. First, the companies should have different degrees of international 
experience, as measured by the number of their global subsidiaries and their years of 
experience in the Russian market. Previous research has found that international experience 
represents a valuable tacit knowledge about how to appropriately organize and manage 
subsidiaries in different foreign markets (Eriksson et al. 1997; 2000; Hollender, Sapkau, & 
Schwens 2017). Experience in a variety of international markets exposes managers to different 
business practices and problem-solving strategies (Hohenthal, Johanson & Johanson 2014), and 
that in turn better equips them to make sense of, and respond to, different market conditions 
(Cieslik, Kaciak & Thongpapanl 2015; Dow & Larimo, 2011). International experience has 
further been shown to enhance managers’ capacity to learn (Presutti, Boari, & Fratocchi 2007; 
Zahra & Hayton 2008; Coeurderoy et al. 2012). Broad experience in one foreign market has 
also been shown to enhance managers’ access to and interpretation of foreign-market 
knowledge (Presutti, Boari & Fratocchi 2007; Lindstrand, Melèn, & Nordman 2011). In the 
sampling selection, I therefore based the case selection on the assumption that cases with a 
different number of global subsidiaries and years of experience in the Russian market 
(documented by the year of established subsidiary in the Russian market) could reveal 
variations in managerial learning. 
Second, the companies should have different degrees of resource commitment in the Russian 
market with regard to their ownership structure and organizational size. Research has shown 
that the various modes of ownership structure provide various levels of access to foreign- 
market knowledge and have different premises for learning (Muniady et al. 2015). I therefore 
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expect that cases with different ownership structure (documented by the entry-mode 
classification by Pan & Tse 2000) would disclose variations in learning. Research has also 
shown that organizational size, as measured by the number of employees, provides various 
amounts of resources to spend on searching for and interpreting foreign- market knowledge 
(Presutti, Boari, & Fratocchi 2007). I therefore further expected that variations in 
organizational size (documented with number of employees in the home market and in the 
Russian market) would reveal variations in learning. 
From the second sampling approach, I selected four cases from the sample population to 
represent the maximum variation in learning ability. This made it possible to detect uniqueness 
and diversity in learning, and to identify common patterns of learning to make an aggregated 
representation of the population (Huber & Power 1985). 
The sampling approach resulted in cases with similar contextual backgrounds but with 
different organizational conditions that would capture maximum variations in managerial 
learning. My selection of the final four cases strove for archetypical cases to represent the 
different organizational conditions. The following cases were finally selected for empirical 
investigation: 
Table 3: Sample of case companies 
 
3.2. Data collection 
In the autumn of 2012, I conducted in-depth interviews with respondents from the four case 
companies. I chose the respondents based on their insight and knowledge about the 
phenomenon studied. My main selection criteria were that they should have direct involvement 
with the company’s investments in the foreign market since the year of establishment of the 
subsidiary (Moran 2005) and hold a managerial role (Dhanaraj, Lyles, & Steensma 2004). This 
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could ensure that they were the ones most involved with the investments and knowledgeable 
about the internationalization process, and that they were the first recipients of foreign-market 
knowledge and facilitators for learning. 
From the case companies I am calling Alpha and Bravo, the respondents are the Country 
Manager of the Russian market. In Charlie, the respondent is the Chief Executive Officer, and 
in Delta the respondent is the General Director of the representative office that binds and 
manages all their different modes of ownership in the market. Three of my interviews were 
performed in person, while one interview was conducted with videoconference through Skype. 
These two approaches for conducting interviews, though relatively different in their format, 
have similar outputs (Morgan & Symon 2004; Quinn et al. 1980). 
I conducted semi-structural interviews to ensure flexibility. I wanted to direct the discussions 
to the respondents’ interests and emphasis on particular topics and to allow follow-up questions 
based on their engagement (Alvesson 2011). The interview guide was designed from the 
theoretical constructs of organizational learning and social capital, by capturing managers’ 
perception, interpretation, and response to foreign-market institutions, and the role of 
connections, relations, and cognition to foster better learning.  
As the respondents needed to reflect on retrospective experiences about the 
internationalization process, the uncertainty about inaccuracy arises because of the potential for 
providing incomplete information thanks to the limitations of recall and biased perceptions by 
the respondents (Huber and Power 1985). To limit such uncertainties, I would ask for both 
factual details and illustrative situations and episodes (Agndal, Chetty, & Wilson 2008; Huber 
& Power 1985). These interviews were transcribed and then sent back to the respondents to 
allow for changes, such as adding to or withdrawing information they had given (Huber & 
Power 1985). 
 
3.3 Data analysis. 
A first- and second-order analysis of the empirical data was conducted from a categorical 
analytical framework (Gioia & Chittipeddi 1991; Van Maanen 1979). The first-order analysis 
was conducted by writing descriptive narratives about learning during internationalization and 
how the three dimensions of social capital had been a source for learning. The narratives were 
written from the viewpoint of the managers themselves (Geertz 1973; Schwandt 2007) to 
provide high accuracy to the empirical data (Czarniawska 2004). 
A second-order analysis was performed to capture theoretical constructs from the narratives. 
Emerging topics and themes from the narratives were systematically organized and assembled 
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in accordance to the theoretical constructs of organizational learning and social capital (Gioia & 
Chittipeddi 1991; Glaser & Strauss 1967; Langley 1999; Van Maanen 1979). The empirical 
data was examined against the theoretical constructs to find explanatory dimensions at a higher 
level of abstraction than the respondents’ common-sense interpretations, thereby providing a 
deeper explanation about the phenomenon. The coding approach I adopted in this study is 
similar to and inspired by two studies conducted by Pellegrino and McNaughton: their study 
from 2015, dealing with internal and external sources for learning and their effects on an 
incremental internationalization process, and their study from 2017, dealing with how sources 
for learning change in various stages of the internationalization process. 
  
4. Empirical findings  
In this section, I outline a first-order analysis about the case companies’ patterns of 
internationalization (from initial establishment till the today’s operations) and strategic 
decisions (e.g., entry mode, ownership and management structure, communication/contact 
between the headquarters and the subsidiary, and the governing of corporate culture and norms 
and national culture and bureaucracy) made by the manager when challenged by institutions of 
the foreign market. I retell and assemble critical experiences by managers of the case 
companies that have driven internationalization forward, and that have constrained and 
facilitated for the managerial learning process. The stories are clustered within the three 
dimensions of social capital to reveal how these dimensions have been a source for learning.  
 
4.1. Structural dimension 
Alpha established a representative office in Moscow in the 1990’s. During its first ten years 
in the market, it made only small and sporadic deliveries. In 2003, the Country Manager (CM) 
recognized opportunities for increasing deliveries to a growing offshore subsea market. The 
CM also understood the usefulness of connections to access potential customers and 
governmental bodies and authorities. He therefore contacted Alpha’s main potential client and 
arranged several formal meetings and presentations about his company’s expertise and products 
for the subsea market. His sporadic interactions with the client increased over the following 
years, but eventually he encountered challenges. The main contact point at the client company 
experienced internal pressure and constraints, as the top management disapproved of the time 
and resources being spent on the foreign company. The top management could only accept the 
intensive interaction if the two companies entered into a strategic alliance. That alliance was 
struck in 2005, and it proved fruitful, resulting in increased demand for subsea solutions. 
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Meanwhile, the CM, recognizing further potential in the market, decided to establish a 
subsidiary in Moscow in 2007. When establishing it, he was informed by his alliance partner 
that the Russian government required at least 60% local content in all deliveries to oil and gas 
projects. To meet this requirement, the CM decided to build a local production facility with a 
native workforce. Thus, a production facility was established in St. Petersburg, and an 
agreement was reached with a Russian university to offer a postgraduate engineering program 
in subsea technology. The CM stresses that the postgraduate program was a means not only for 
building a native workforce, but also for political recognition and reputation: “The Russian 
government can see that we educate Russian students in new scientific areas, that we transfer 
technology and knowledge, while we meet the requirement for local content.” (Country 
Manager, Alpha). 
Bravo’s Country Manager (CM), meanwhile, received a request in 2003 from a Russian 
contractor to export their cable ladders and cable tray systems to an oil rig. At the time, the CM 
had not thought of Russia as a potential export market. But he seized the opportunity and 
agreed with the contractor to directly export their products. During this delivery, the CM was 
contacted by a Russian trade agent who offered to market and sell their products as an 
intermediary. The CM had already experienced constraints within the market, particularly 
related to dissonance in the business culture and ambiguity in red tape. The CM recognized 
several benefits of using an intermediary, such as their assistance and advice on how to 
conform to the expectations of the market and to increase export activities through the agent. 
With these benefits, the CM engaged the agent as an intermediary in 2005. 
After years of cooperation with the agent, the CM forecast opportunities for increasing their 
deliveries. He understood that such an ambition required a local presence, so he established a 
subsidiary in St. Petersburg in 2011: “After many years, we have learned that a larger market 
penetration and greater sales are only possible in markets where we have a subsidiary. Such 
ambitions are not attainable through an agent.” (Country Manager, Bravo). 
Because the relation with the agent had grown strong over the years, the CM and the agent 
had developed a close trust-based relationship with a mutual understanding of activities and 
ambitions in the market. As a result, the CM decided to extend their collaboration with the 
agent by engaging him as a minority owner and General Director (GD) of the subsidiary. 
Charlie, the third company, was awarded a large fabrication project in Norway in 2004, but 
the company was put under pressure to deliver quickly and at low-cost. Its Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) had been monitoring the Russian market for years and forecast large 
opportunities for deliveries to the growing offshore market. The CEO convinced others in the 
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top management of the company to immediately establish a subsidiary in Archangelsk, arguing 
that the company could ensure low-cost production at its own facilities, and to position itself 
toward future offshore projects. 
Because of time pressure, the entry process needed to be quick and without complications. 
But the CEO feared that red tape and bureaucracy could slow down establishment. They 
therefore decided to acquire an already well-established Russian company: “We did not have 
time to establish a subsidiary from scratch. The bureaucracy of paperwork, signatures, and 
stamps for establishing a firm takes time, moving from local to central authority, back and forth.” 
(CEO, Charlie). After pressure from the local government regarding what company to buy, an 
acquisition occurred in 2005, with the Russian company as minority owner. 
Nonetheless, the CEO encountered great challenges in the partnership, particularly related to 
dissonance in business culture, the way of conducting business, and various challenges in 
aligning goals and ambitions: “The Russians were more interested in earning quick money… Our 
partner expected more financial return than we regarded as realistic.” (CEO, Charlie). Because 
of these challenges, the local minority owner withdrew a year later, so that the company became 
sole owner of the subsidiary. The CEO also found it necessary to establish links to consultancies 
to get help in interpreting and complying with laws and regulations as well as business norms and 
culture. Two Norwegian consultancy companies were initially hired to assist the company. Later, 
on a more permanent basis, the CEO hired local consultancies—one Russian lawyer working at 
the local port authority and one Russian advisor working at the local municipality. 
Delta, the fourth company, entered the Russian market in the mid-1990s by establishing a 
representative office in Moscow. To gain easy access there and to quickly establish a strong 
market position, the company acquired several well-established companies operating in that same 
market and also entered several joint ventures. Among others, the company bought an English 
engineering company in 1995, and a year later it bought another larger English conglomerate in 
Moscow. It then entered a joint venture with a Russian company with large production facilities 
in Archangelsk. 
In 1997, the Asian crisis influenced a dramatic downturn in the oil and gas sector because of 
a fall in the oil price. Delta experienced financial pressure as a result and had to reorganize its 
headquarters in Norway; it also had to exit several subsidiaries and ventures in international 
markets. The company sold all acquired companies in Russia and withdrew from all joint 
ventures except for its venture in Archangelsk. When the economy recovered in 2004, they 
again entered a joint venture with a Russian company in Astrakhan only to withdraw from it a 
year later because of challenges in aligning the partner’s business culture, way of conducting 
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business, and goals.  
The General Director (GD) was involved with entering and withdrawing from all 
acquisitions and joint ventures from the middle of the 1990s, and stresses that because of those 
activities, the representative office held an important function as an interface between all 
partnerships and projects in the market: “The office operates as an interface for all our 
activities, in business development and legal concerns and in licenses—everything related to 
our business in Russia.” (General Director, Delta). Furthermore, with little effort from the GD, 
the company met requirements of 60% local content through the manpower and facilities held 
by the buy-ups and ventures. 
4.2. Relational dimension 
Delta built multiple relations through its buy-ups and ventures, with the main goal for short-
term economic benefits driven from its relations. The relations established in the market were 
mainly initiated to gain easy access to companies with established market advantages and 
attractive projects: “When we identify projects with opportunities, we have bought and entered 
partnerships to win the projects.” (General Director, Delta). Such pragmatic, established sparse 
relations were also preferred for their flexibility, allowing the company to rapidly enter and 
withdraw from ventures and projects in its search for other more profitable relations. This 
flexibility became important for the company during the financial crunch in 1997, when it 
withdrew from several relations to avoid profit losses. 
The General Director (GD) also emphasized the advantages of such relations for overcoming 
non-transparent tender processes and project awards, as he found that foreigners are 
disregarded and downgraded in such formalities. Through the relations, the GD could gain 
easier access to projects, because the relations already established position in tender and award 
processes. Market position has been a crucial factor for the GD when making evaluations 
regarding which companies to buy and enter into ventures with. 
The personal engagement of the GD has played a key role in driving internationalization 
processes forward. He ensured that the necessary foundation existed at the representative office 
for finding and entering prospective buy-ups and ventures. The GD stressed the importance of 
individual engagement and recognition of opportunities during internationalization in 
challenging markets: 
“You need, and this goes for all countries which can be regarded as quite challenging, 
that there is someone who recognizes opportunities, and is willing, and personally 
engaged in travelling and living in the country to establish the necessary foundation for 
further activities in the market. You need people who are willing to take these challenges, 
and this drives processes forward.” (General Director, Delta) 
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The GD attempted to include and give responsibility to other employees in strategic 
decision-making and the process of buy-ups and ventures. He expected that native Russians’ 
extensive experience in the oil and gas market and their competence in business could be 
resources in good decision-making and compliance with business norms and culture. But the 
CEO found that employees were not able to act autonomously. He explained the gap in 
expectations as being due to the employees’ embeddedness in a hierarchical management style 
with little autonomy in Russia: 
“This is something we have worked active with, to convince the employees to work 
independent and make business decisions. However, it has been a long and slow process 
convincing them to work autonomous… Russian employees are very afraid of doing 
something wrong. Consequently, it becomes much safer for them to do nothing at all, than 
doing something wrong… As this may result in punishment.” (General Director, Delta) 
 
Relations established by Charlie were also pragmatic. The initial acquisition of the local 
company was undertaken to take advantage of the company’s facilities and to overcome red 
tape. The CEO also stressed that they hoped for transfer of market knowledge from their 
relation to learn about and adapt to business norms and culture. However, there was little 
transfer of knowledge between the relations, and the relation lasted only a year because of 
disagreements. The relations established with consultancies in both Norway and Russia were 
mainly intended to provide information and advice on difficult processes and situations—e.g., 
ensuring compliance with laws and regulations in situations such as when the local authorities 
made unannounced inspections of their facilities during the early phase of establishment, or 
when applications sent to local authorities for authorizations and licenses were given low 
priority and often got no response. Feeling clueless as to why these situations arose and how to 
respond to them, the CEO often consulted with their advisors at the local municipality. Similar 
experiences were met at the local harbor. When a shipment of goods arrived there, the local 
customs would often place the goods in custody, saying that the packing list was incomplete. In 
such instances, the CEO consulted with their advisor at the port authority, who could always 
solve the problems and “misunderstandings”. 
“We frequently experienced that small faults in the building construction were registered 
as errors, and that the errors were fined and expected to be improved within an 
unrealistically short timeframe, or else there would be a new fine. We did not know how 
to handle such situations, and therefore needed good help from our advisor at the 
municipality.” (Chief Officer Executive, Charlie) 
 
Charlie’s internationalization to the Russian market was initiated and driven by the CEO. He 
also had a colleague who assisted and was heavily involved in the process. When the subsidiary 
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was established, that colleague was hired as the General Director (GD). The main reporting of 
activities at the subsidiary back to headquarters was limited to flow between the CEO and GD. 
Daily phone calls and weekly Skype calls allowed them to consult with and update each other 
on what was happening at the subsidiary and in the market. In the initial phase of operations, 
the two managers tried to include other middle managers from the subsidiary, all of whom were 
native Russians. The intention was to enrich the discussions by getting a Russian-minded 
perspective on issues. But this involvement did not work as intended, mainly due to the poor 
English language skills of the middle managers, so they were excluded from the daily and 
weekly discussions with headquarters: 
“The other employees participated in Skype-meetings in the beginning, but this 
became rather a problem. They did not understand, or they misinterpreted what was 
discussed. They also gradually became rather passive in the meetings because of their 
less-developed English competence.” (General Director, Charlie) 
 
Bravo was gradually strengthening the relationships it had developed in the market. In the 
initial stage of internationalization when products were exported through their local agent, its 
main objective with the relation was to benefit from economic advantage. However, the 
Country Manager (CM) invested resources and time to build strong relations with their agent. 
Weekly phone calls and personal meetings were arranged both in Russia and in Norway. 
Gradually the CM and the agent developed a personal relationship, not simply a working one. 
So when the CM initiated a process for establishing the subsidiary, the agent was engaged as a 
minority owner and General Director (GD). The reciprocity and trust that had developed 
between them over the previous five years made this a natural decision. The nine employees at 
the agent’s office were also hired as administrative personnel at the subsidiary. The CM 
emphasized the benefits of engaging their agent and his employees because of their local 
knowledge about the oil and gas market and about appropriate compliance to business norms 
and culture: 
“Clearly there is an advantage to having a partner who speaks the language and knows 
the market… They have a completely different culture, a different 
language… So, without people from the inside, I am sorry, then one does not even have to 
try! Because there are so many barriers to cope with!” (Country Manager, Bravo) 
 
Communication between the Norwegian headquarters and the Russian subsidiary mainly 
flowed between the CM and GD. They conducted daily phone calls and Skype meetings to 
share formal information and report about operations, the market, and possible projects, and to 
exchange informal conversations about life, family, and personal interests: “We conduct a lot 
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of Skype meetings, meetings with the board, and have close follow-up…We talk together 
almost every day, and often several times a day.” (Country Manager, Bravo). The CM regarded 
the informality of the dialogue as important for developing a close, friendly, and personal 
relationship. The CM stressed that, although the GM held decision-making authority and was 
held responsible for the subsidiary results, it was important that the CM was involved to ensure 
that decisions and results conformed to headquarters’ goals and expectations. The relationship 
that developed between the CM and the GD became important for the internationalization 
process. Their engagement, cooperation, and commitment were driving internationalization 
forward. 
The manager at Alpha was also gradually strengthening the relations developed in the 
market. When the Country Manager (CM) increased their representation there, he worked hard 
to create relations with key representatives of their main potential client in the market: “We 
managed this through faithful work, and by knocking on doors. We have never given up; we 
have come up with new initiatives, presented reports, and held lectures about our competence 
and technology.” (Country Manager, Alpha). When the company entered an alliance with their 
potential client, the CM emphasized creating close, trust-based relations by spending time and 
resources on building relationships. The CM was in the forefront of driving internationalization 
forward, by initiating, coordinating, and maintaining relationships with their client. He stresses 
that such personal engagement becomes particularly important when moving into a challenging 
and different market: “It became important to find key personnel within our company that 
could take some ownership of the internationalization process. Enthusiasts who could drive 
processes forward. Someone that could see opportunities in a dynamic and unexpected 
market.” (Country Manager, Alpha).  
When the subsidiary was established, a native Russian was hired as the General Director 
(GD). The GD had already worked at the company’s headquarters in Norway for s e v e r a l  
years in sales and marketing. By hiring someone who already had close relations with the 
company, they could ensure that goals and ambitions were aligned with those of headquarters. 
Communication between headquarters and the subsidiary mainly flowed between the CM and  
the GD. Phone calls were made several days a week, and the GD travelled to Russia each month 
to meet with the CM. Formally, the GD held decision-making authority and was responsible for 
the subsidiary performance and results, but the CM was most often involved in decision-
making: “The GD has great respect for us that  have been working in the sector for years; he 




4.3. Cognitive dimension 
The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) at Charlie decided to acquire a local company mainly to 
help deal with the expected red tape and bureaucracy, with slow processes and complex 
requirements in formalities and procedures: “We did not have time to establish a subsidiary 
from scratch. The bureaucracy of paperwork, signatures, and stamps for establishing a firm 
takes time, moving from local to central authority, back and forth.” (General Director, Charlie). 
The consultancies were also hired to assist in interpreting and responding to the bureaucracy 
and to ensure conformity to business norms and cultures. Nonetheless, the CEO and the 
GD perceived Russian business norms, culture, and red tape to be too demanding and difficult 
to respond to, so that they rather avoided conforming to red tape. The managers aspired to 
conduct business as t hey were accustomed to in Norway. The following story about 
applying for a permit to build a new production facility exemplifies how they interpreted 
and responded to the bureaucracy and business norms: 
“...applications have gone shuttling between federal and country authorities and city 
administration. If you look at the correspondence, one advisor says no, you must apply 
there! Then the next advisor says no, you must apply there! Then you must apply to another 
one! The application ends up in a closed drawer without any feedback.” (General 
Director, Charlie). “To put it this way, we do not have a building permit yet, and it has been 
five to six years since we started the application process for a production hall. However, 
the building has been raised without any approval! In the process of getting the 
application approved, we have produced several projects in the hall, which in reality 
should be closed and sealed because of no building permit.” (Chief Executive Officer, 
Charlie) 
 
The managers were also frustrated by the detail-oriented procedures that were enforced by 
the prevailing accounting norms. So they simply sidestepped those norms, as they found them 
entirely too frustrating and time-wasting: 
“Our accountant demands that we hold strict control over small accessories used in 
production. Forms need to be filled out by employees when picking up silly things such 
as pens and earplugs, which need to be signed and stamped by managers. For us this is 
totally a waste of time and too rigid formalities, so we instead unassigned the 
accountant responsibility for accessories in production to escape these ridiculous 
formalities.” (General Director, Charlie) 
 
The CEO’s perception of dissonance in business norms and culture is one of the arguments 
for their hiring a native Norwegian General Director at the subsidiary. With a native Norwegian, 
they can ensure that headquarters’ corporate culture develops at the subsidiary, thereby avoiding 
the Russian hierarchical management style: “With a Russian Director we would get the old 
school, a very macho and dictatorial Director. We did not want this in our subsidiary, so 
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without hesitation we hired a native Norwegian General Director.” (Chief Executive Officer, 
Charlie). 
The GD of Delta also perceived ambiguity in interpreting procedures and requirements when 
applying for licenses and certifications. The GD tended to compare requirements in Russia 
with what is customary in Norway and felt that it was impossible to benefit from experience 
from Norway because of the differences between business cultures and norms. This ambiguity, 
which was costly in both time and resources, was considered the greatest constraint on 
operating in Russia. Nonetheless, the GD understood that he had to comply with 
requirements and expectations in the market to obtain and maintain the license to operate. The 
GD’s interpretation and response to these ambiguities are exemplified by the following story: 
“For instance, companies need to work out a document of 40,000 pages just to get 
approval for participating at an oil and gas field. We need to act in accordance with 107 
different entities, while in Norway we only relate to one, the Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate; you need just one approval. In Russia, you need ten various certifications, 
while in Norway you require one certification for similar activities...You should not 
underestimate how bureaucratic it actually is. However, one needs to comply to maintain 
the license to operate in the market.” (General Director, Delta) 
 
Regarding dissonance in business norms and culture, the GD stressed that this was the main 
challenge for many of their joint ventures. The GD experienced that partners had different 
understandings about appropriate behavior and decisions. To avoid dissonance, the GD 
attempted to ensure that the ventures were managed and organized within the context of 
Norwegian business norms and culture. The GD says that a venture with a Russian partner 
always needs to lay the foundations of management and organization before the partnership is 
entered: 
“This is an example of bad business alignment with a Russian partner, which resulted in a 
conflict. We have learned that a joint venture with a Russian partner ought to be very 
good. Every aspect of operation and how things ought to be done should be decided in 
advance. Selection of the right partners is critical for creating a long-term partnership 
and survival!” (General Director, Delta) 
 
The Country Managers at Alpha and Bravo recognized similar ambiguities in bureaucracy, 
business norms, and culture, but put less stress on these features of the market compared to the 
GD of Delta. The CMs were more open to the differences that existed and tried to avoid 
drawing comparisons with the Norwegian market. The CMs were also attempting to adjust their 
behavior and decisions to the expectations of the market. The CM of Bravo said, 
philosophically: “…this is how it is, we need to act in accord to this...We do in a way depend on 
this system when entering this market, and are the one who needs to ‘pipe down’; yes, that is 
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us!” (Country Manager, Bravo). 
The two CMs were also more reflective in attempting to understand why these features of 
the market existed. Both referred to Russian history in their attempt to obtain greater insight 
into today’s market situation. For instance, the CM of Bravo explained the rigidity of 
documentation and information required by the bureaucracy as a product of Soviet times: “In 
these times few citizens trusted the Russian government, and vice versa.” He believes that the 
government has developed a system whereby it can control the behavior of its citizens to ensure 
that nothing untoward is happening. By using extensive documentation, stamps, and signatures 
for every activity, people can prove that they are loyal citizens. It is not my intention to judge 
whether the views of the CMs are correct. However, they show the CMs’ effort to develop a 
greater understanding of why this rigidity occurs in the market. Both CMs have strategically 
decided to hire a native Russian as General Director for the subsidiary to have someone who is 
embedded in and understands the market, the bureaucracy culture, and norms that can ensure 
compliance. The CM from Alpha also emphasized the importance of a native GD to gain access 
to clients, governmental bodies, and authorities to which foreigner’s access is limited: 
“I think for us it is much easier to gain admittance and access to many of the companies 
t ha t  we which to cooperate with. For instance, if we have a meeting in the Duma [an 
often-used term for the legislative assembly in Russia] then we [Norwegians] would not 
be admitted, but he [the Russian GD] is. This is due to security reasons in which we 
[Norwegians]are not admitted, but Russians are.” (Country Manager, Alpha) 
 
Nonetheless, the CMs from Alpha and Bravo experienced dissonance in creating a consensus 
on how to conduct business because of the different embedded business cultures. To ensure that 
the goals and values of headquarters are implemented in the subsidiary’s business culture, the 
CMs had daily and weekly communication with the General Directors and arranged training 
programs for their native Russian employees. At both companies, employees participated in 
training programs at the Norwegian headquarters to help them learn about the Norwegian 
business culture and the company’s norms and regulation: 
“We follow our subsidiaries closely, the employees are often here, management of 
headquarters are often there, to sort of guide and teach the employees, and to incorporate 
them into our culture. Employees from the Russian office are in Norway many times a 
year. Sometimes they are here for teaching and other times they come with customers.” 
(Country Manager, Bravo) 
 
5. Discussions 
The narratives in the previous section have captured how managers perceived, interpreted, 
and responded to knowledge of foreign-market institutions, and in what form the three 
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dimensions of social capital have been a source of learning. In the following sections, I offer a 
second-order analysis to develop an overall understanding and coherence about managerial 
learning from social capital when challenged by host-market institutions. 
 
5.1. Various levels of learning 
From the narratives, it becomes evident that managers of the case companies hold pretty 
similar perceptions about the challenges arising from foreign-market institutions. A recurring 
theme from all the respondents in the study is the perception of constraints during 
internationalization due to ambiguity from red tape in the bureaucracy and dissonance in the 
business culture. However, the managers demonstrated different approaches in how they 
interpret and respond to institutions, perhaps best explained by the idea that managers learn at 
various levels (Daft & Weick 1984; Fiol 1994; Hedberg 1981; Huber 1991). To answer the first 
research question posed in the introduction, I contend that managers hold similar perceptions 
about foreign-market institutions, but they interpret and respond to those institutions from 
various levels of learning, resulting in different enactment on institutions of the foreign market. 
The first-order analysis reveals that the managerial learning process by managers of Alpha and 
Bravo occurs at a higher level of learning, while the learning process by managers of Charlie 
and Delta occurs at a lower level. 
From the stories told, it becomes evident that managers of Charlie and Delta appear to be 
stubborn men with little appetite for integrating knowledge about red tape and business culture 
into their existing beliefs about appropriate patterns of internationalization and strategic 
decisions. These managers express frustration with the differences they encounter in 
institutions of the foreign market compared to their home market and other international 
markets they have invested in. They often refer to the foreign-market institutions as too 
difficult, demanding, and complex to understand and confirm to. Both managers interpret 
experiences with institutions from their own strong beliefs, born from conditions of their home 
market. They seem to believe that the home-market institutions are based on an ideal logic. 
Such an approach to learning became evident when Charlie’s manager decided to build a 
production facility without a permit. He need not comply with accounting norms, he decided, 
because he found them too rigid and unnecessary. Meanwhile, Delta’s manager decided to 
enforce Norwegian business culture in its acquisitions, but at the same time withdraw from a 
joint venture because of challenges in merging two different business cultures. 
These managers made changes in behavior only when they felt it absolutely necessary for 
meeting requirements and maintaining their legitimacy to operate in the foreign market. Such 
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behavior is reflected in situations when the manager from Charlie acquired a local company 
merely to avoid slow procedures and complications during establishment in the foreign market. 
In addition, when in those situations Delta’s manager acquired and entered joint ventures to 
ensure access to lucrative projects and to easily meet the requirement of 60% local content. 
Both managers tend to strive for “business as usual” by managing the subsidiaries from 
established home-market ideas about appropriate patterns of internationalization and strategic 
decision-making during internationalization. 
In contrast, the narratives disclose that Alpha’s and Bravo’s managers seem willing to 
integrate foreign-market institutions into existing beliefs and to change patterns of 
internationalization and adjust strategic decisions to ensure fit and consistency with institutions 
of the foreign market. Though these managers, too, expressed frustration about the constraints 
from red tape and business culture, they try to view these constraints from the perspective of 
the foreign market. For example, Bravo’s manager said that “[we] are the ones that have to 
pipe-down,” while Alpha’s manager said that they had shattered many of the myths about risky 
and incomprehensible laws and requirements. These managers clearly brought a more accepting 
understanding of institutions of the foreign market. 
They have also constantly made changes in their patterns of internationalization and 
strategic decisions to conform to foreign-market institutions. This became apparent in the 
narrative, for instance when the manager at Alpha entered a strategic alliance because he 
understood that it was important for their partners to legitimize their cooperation, or when he 
established the engineering center and the post-graduate program to meet the requirement for 
60% local content, or when Bravo’s manager hired the agent to get assistance in deliveries to 
the market, and, later, when he hired the agent as minority owner and General Director when 
the subsidiary was established. 
These recapitulations of the managerial learning process in the four case companies show 
that managers learning at a higher level interpret and respond to perceptions of foreign-market 
institutions using a flexible non-routine-based approach by changing their behavior in the 
foreign market to ensure institutional conformity. Further, that managers learning at a lower 
level interpret and respond to institutions from a fixed routine-based approach by making minor 
adjustments in behavior only when absolutely necessary and therefore maintain institutional 
dissonance. Table 4 summarizes these differences in the managerial learning process seen in the 
case companies. The table shows how the case companies, while holding similar perceptions 
about foreign-market institutions, interpret and respond to institutions in diverse ways, with 
different overall aims for enactment. The table refers to concrete experiences the managers 
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have mentioned during the interviews to show how they interpreted and responded to concrete 













         Table 4: The managerial learning process in the case companies 
 






For the first delivery to Russia, we produced in 
the home market as our new engineering center 
could not complete such a large order. We knew 
there would be challenges at customs that could 
delay the shipment. Delays at customs may be 
due to incomplete paperwork or because the 
products are unfamiliar to customs officers. 
We do not accept anything called shortcuts. 
Making arrangements “under the table” 
would have been easy in Russia, but that is 
totally unacceptable. 
The many struggles with both 
internal and external 
requirements slow down 
operations. External 
requirements were rigid and 
detail-oriented in ways that 
are not necessary. 
Language is a central barrier and the 
bureaucracy is a huge challenge. One should 









We therefore made our Russian customer 
responsible for the shipment. We used Russian 
companies to pick up the delivery at our facilities 
in Norway. This was to ensure that we could get 
the delivery painlessly over the border. 
The native Russian GD does not always think 
like a Westerner; hence we must work to find 
solutions. Sometimes I just give in because I 
do think like a Westerner. If it had been 
Norwegians working in Russia, even if they 
all spoke Russian, they would still be 
Norwegian and would not have the Russian 
way of thinking. I think that is important in 
this game. 
Our accountant demands that 
we hold strict control over 
small items. Forms must be 
filled in by employees when 
picking up things like pens 
and earplugs These then 
must be signed and stamped 
by managers. 
In Norway, you relate to EU rules. In Russia, 
you need ten different certificates to start an 
operation, while in Norway you only need 
one. Within engineering you need licenses to 
show that you have the skills, capacity, and 
safety procedures. It would cost around 0.75 
to 1 million to obtain certification. One oil 
company wrote 40,000 pages seeking 






We had an incredible experience. We sent the 
largest components by boat across Arctic waters 
with an icebreaker leading. This had only been 
done previously with raw materials. We placed 
tons of equipment on the largest Russian 
transportation flight. We also sent some of the 
components by ship. We did everything! 
We have a staff of 9 people in St. Petersburg. 
They are all native Russians. That is a 
conscious, strategic choice. It is locals who 
best know market conditions. 
For us this was a complete 
waste of time, so we 
removed the responsibility 
for accessories that was held 
by the accountant. 
 
We have the competence here at the office to 
handle such challenges. And if they are not 
able to handle it, we go to external 
consultants. We have done it the right way, 




We were conscious of the problems that can 
occur at the border. In general, everything that is 
planned and executed within the local norms goes 
well. 
Things that you take for granted, our local 
employees might say that it would never 
work here. To speak the language and 
understand the local knowledge creates 
greater competitive benefits. 
We did this so that we could 
escape the silly formalities. 
In Norway, we have norm-based rules; in 
Russia it is different. This is a society where 
many seek errors.  If you find an error you 
can either look beyond it or demand a 
penalty, which means money. This is how 
you develop a society where the stamp needs 




The findings I share in this study correspond to extant research literature that also shows 
how learning can occur at various levels, and how this directs different enactment on 
knowledge about the foreign market (Dimitratos et al. 2014; Engelhard & Nägele 2003; Hau & 
Evangelista 2007; Mu, Gnyawali & Hatfield 2007; Saka-Helmhout 2007). Previous studies 
have explained variations in learning based on empirical evidence about how foreign 
subsidiaries act on knowledge that flows between headquarters in the home market and their 
foreign subsidiaries (Saka-Helmhout 2007), and on empirical evidence about how embedded 
the foreign subsidiary is, either to headquarters in the home market or to the foreign market 
(Dimitratos et al. 2014; Mu, Gnyawali & Hatfield (2007). In this study, I explain the various 
levels of learning based on how managers of subsidiaries interpret and respond to unfamiliar 
institutions in the foreign market. This provides new insight into the various levels of learning 
from a managerial perspective, and managers’ enactment on knowledge about institutions of 
the foreign market. 
Managers’ enactment on knowledge about foreign-market institutions can further be 
explained by managers’ learning intent. In line with previous studies on that topic (Engelhard 
& Nägele 2003; Hamel 1991; Minbaeva et al. 2002; Tsang 1999), I show here how managers 
with a greater openness to learning are better equipped to interpret foreign-market institutions 
and to respond to them by adjusting patterns of internationalization and strategic decisions to 
ensure fit and conformity to foreign-market institutions (Hamel 1991; Hau & Evangelista 2007; 
Minbaeva et al. 2002; Tsang 1999). 
The managerial perspective I have provided in this paper also reveals that 
internationalization by the case companies has been driven by the managers’ personal 
engagement and entrepreneurial orientation. These managers’ determination and courage have 
ensured access and survival in the foreign market, independent of whether the manager 
demonstrated learning at a higher or lower level. These managers are also the ones that have 
invested in connections, relations, and cognitions and made use of the knowledge they have 
gained from their social capital, also independent on what forms of the three dimensions they 
have invested. 
 
5.2. Learning from social capital 
The narratives further reveal that managers of the case companies have invested in different 
forms of the three dimensions of social capital and that the various forms have affected their 
degree of learning from social capital. To answer the second research question, I argue that 
managers who have formed embedded relationships with a few key business connections in the 
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foreign market, and that share a cognitive frame of reference with their relations, have better 
premises to interpret and respond to foreign-market institutions. This argument implies that all 
three dimensions of social capital are important for enhancing managerial learning during 
internationalization. From the narratives, I further argue that the managers’ learning intent has 
influenced the way they exploit the knowledge that is made available through their social 
capital. Managers with a great receptivity to learning make more effort in acquiring and 
utilizing knowledge that is made available from their social capital. 
From the stories told by the respondents participating in this study, it becomes evident that 
Alpha’s and Bravo’s managers have formed embedded relations with a few bonded connections 
that share a cognitive frame of reference. These mangers have taken advantage of the 
knowledge they have gained from their social capital by adjusting their patterns of 
internationalization and strategic decisions to the foreign-market institutions, and as such 
demonstrate that their managerial learning process has been enhanced by their investment in 
social capital. The managers of Charlie and Bravo, meanwhile, have formed arms-length 
relations with bridges and linkages in the market with an absence of shared cognition. Although 
these managers show that they have gained knowledge about foreign-market institutions from 
those arms-length bridges and linkages, they have not been willing to act on the knowledge 
gained, and therefore demonstrate that their investment in social capital has not enhanced their 
managerial learning process, when taking into assumption that learning occurs when managers 
make changes in patterns of internationalization and strategic decisions to confirm to foreign- 
market institutions. 
When recapitulating the internationalization process by the manager of Alpha, it becomes 
evident that he put significant effort into developing bonded connections with their main client 
in the foreign market during the establishment phase. As expressed by the respondent himself, 
they were “knocking on doors and never giving up.” The interaction with their client gradually 
increased over the years, with the result that they developed similar expectations and aims. 
When Alpha and their main client entered a strategic alliance, their relations grew into mutual 
dependency and trust with expectations of reciprocity. It becomes clear from the stories told by 
the manager that their relationship was grounded on altruistic motives with the expectation of 
long-lasting relations. The manager demonstrates a commitment to creating a deeper 
understanding of the foreign-market institutions in order to build cognitive congruence with 
their relations in the market. The internationalization process clearly moved forward based on 




The manager of Bravo also emphasized building embedded relations with their bonded 
connection in the foreign market. The relationship started with an agent in the market.  Over 
time it developed into a close cooperation based on trust and reciprocity with common aims. 
When the manager decided to establish a subsidiary, he built on the trust-based relationship 
with the agent by engaging him as a minority owner and General Director. From the stories 
told, it seems that the manager focused on learning about foreign-market institutions from his 
relations and sought to ensure cognitive coherence to both understand and apply knowledge 
about institutions during internationalization. 
In contrast, Charlie’s manager established linkages to advisors at the local municipality and 
the port authority as well as to two lawyers to get assistance during internationalization. But 
interaction with those relations was sporadic and limited to situations when the manager needed 
help in critical situations. This was characterized as arms-length relations. Because the manager 
relied on knowledge held by his connections, he made little effort to understand foreign-market 
institutions, so a cognitive dissonance resulted. Such reliance on others’ knowledge in the 
market is referred to by previous studies as “grafting.” This distorts learning as managers act 
and make decisions based on the suggestions by others (Lindstrand, Melèn, & Nordman 2011). 
Delta’s manager shows a similar approach to learning from social capital. He created 
multiple, sporadic bridges in the market through acquisitions and joint ventures. Arms-length 
relations were developed with a short duration, as the relations were ended when they became 
less profitable. It seems that the manager made little effort to understand foreign-market 
institutions, as he was frustrated and had little intention of conforming to the institutions of the 
market. He therefore maintained a dissonance to foreign-market institutions. 
With these findings, my study reinforces the extant research literature by demonstrating that 
managers who build embedded relationships in the foreign market with a shared cognitive 
frame of reference enhance managerial learning (Lindstrand, Melen, & Nordman 2011). This 
finding is consistent with the cluster of studies that have investigated how learning occurs from 
the structural and relational dimension of social capital (Collins & Hitt 2006; Dhanaraj, Lyles 
& Steensma 2004; Griffith, Zeybek & O´Brien 2001; Hau & Evangelista 2007; Liu, Ghauri & 
Sinkovics 2010; Moran 2005). In this study, I show that managers who build embedded 
relationships based on mutual trust and dependency with principles of reciprocity are better 
equipped to interpret and respond to knowledge about foreign-market institutions, because 
these forms of social capital enhance managerial learning. 
The findings of my study are also consistent with the cluster of studies that have investigated 
learning from the relational and cognitive dimension of social capital (Coeurderoy et al. 2012; 
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Cohen & Levinthal 1990; Eriksson & Chetty 2003; Lane, Salk & Lyles 2001). The findings of 
this study demonstrate that embedded relationships enhance managers’ absorptive capacity, 
that is shown to foster managerial learning. From this, it seems that those managers who ensure 
cognitive resonance seem to enhance learning, while those managers maintaining cognitive 
dissonance distort learning during internationalization. 
Nonetheless, the findings of my study also support the previous findings by Presutti, Boari, 
and Fratocchi (2007) and Yli-Renko, Autio, and Sapiensa (2001), showing that multiple weak 
connections in the foreign market enhance knowledge acquisition. However, in my study, I 
demonstrate that weak connections are not sufficient when managers intend to learn about 
foreign-market institutions to ensure institutional conformity, and here I support the findings by 
Lindstrand, Melèn, and Nordman (2011). 
Table 5 summarizes the effect of managerial learning and social capital on institutional 
distance. The table shows the managers level of learning and in what form they have invested 
in social capital, and how this affects their enactment on foreign-market institutions. The table 
shows that managers with a genuine willingness to learn and who aim to integrate knowledge 
about foreign-market institutions into their patterns of internationalization and strategic 
decision-making learn from embedded relations with bonded connections and cognitive 
resonance. This approach to managerial learning from social capital seems to enhance the 
managerial learning process and managers are therefore able to ensure institutional conformity. 
On the other hand, managers who are stubborn and unwilling to learn about foreign-market 
institutions, and who aim to maintain operations as usual, are not learning from their bonds and 
linkages with an arms-length relations and cognitive dissonance. This approach to learning 
from social capital distorts the managerial learning process and managers therefore maintain 
institutional conflict.  





Linking Charlie Alpha Bonding Embedded 
relationships 
Cognitive 
resonance Bridging Delta Bravo 
  Institutional conflict                                     Institutional conformity 
 Table 5: The effect of managerial learning and social capital on institutional distance 
 
The importance of embedded relationships and shared cognition in enhancing managerial 
learning can be explained by the context in which I have studied this phenomenon. By using 
case companies from Norway that internationalize to the Russia market, this study highlights 
managers who are exposed to a market where trade and business are grounded on strong 
relations between network connections. The structural dimension of social capital is only 
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relevant in the Russian market to the extent that managers gain access to that market. It is 
fundamentally difficult for a foreign manager to gain a position in a market where business is 
conducted in close networks of family and friends, as in Russia (Frye, Yakovlev & Yasin 2009; 
Michailova & Husted 2003; Peng & Heath 1996). Such closed networks where trade often 
occurs between personal relations that are located outside formal structures (May & Stewart 
2014) can further explain why embedded relationships with mutual trust and dependency, and 
with principles of reciprocity (Michailova & Worm 2003), are seen to enhance learning. The 
findings of this study align with previous research that has shown that close bonds (Sandberg 
2013; Shi et al. 2014) and embedded relationships (Collins & Hitt 2006; Dhanaraj, Lyles & 
Steensma 2004; Griffith, Zeybek, & O´Brien, 2001; Hau & Evangelista 2007; Nahapiet & 
Ghoshal 1998; Moran 2005) are of particular importance when learning from social capital in 
markets that are based on strong network relations. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper reports on a multiple case study investigating how the managerial learning 
process in four Norwegian companies has unfolded when internationalizing to the Russian 
market, challenged by foreign-market institutions, and how these managers’ investment in 
social capital has fostered managerial learning. From the findings of this study, I make three 
main contributions to the research literature focusing on managerial learning from social 
capital. 
First, I contribute fresh insight into how managers enact on foreign-market institutions by 
adjusting their patterns of internationalization and strategic decision-making during 
internationalization. The findings show that while managers hold similar perceptions about 
constraints from institutions in the foreign market, they interpret and respond to institutions 
from various level of learning, demonstrating different enactment on institutions. The empirical 
analysis shows that those managers eager to learn and eager to make sense of foreign-market 
institutions learn at a higher level and enact on institutions to ensure institutional conformity. In 
contrast, managers who are stubborn and close-minded, and who are unwilling to make sense 
of institutions, learn at a lower level, and enact on institutions in a such way that they maintain 
institutional conflict to the foreign market. 
Second, I reconcile an understanding about social capital as consisting of the structural, 
relational, and cognitive dimensions by resolving the inconsistency in conceptualization of 
social capital by extant research literature. The findings demonstrate that all three dimensions 
of social capital play a vital role in enhancing managerial learning during internationalization, 
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but that the various forms of the dimensions, affects the managerial learning process. Building 
on this finding, the third contribution of this study increases an understanding about how the 
three dimensions ought to be formed to enhance managerial learning. I found that those 
managers who share a cognitive frame of reference with embedded relationships that are 
created with few bonds in the foreign market, have better premises to interpret and respond to 
foreign-market institutions. These constellations of the three dimensions of social capital are 
shown to enhance managerial learning during internationalization. Those managers who build 
bridges and linkages with arms-length relations and who maintain an absence of shared 
cognition are less equipped to interpret and respond to institutions, and therefore distort 
managerial learning. 
But this study also has some limitations. I have not taken into consideration managers’ prior 
experiences with internationalization. It may be that managers with international experience are 
better equipped to deal with ambiguities and dissonance stemming from foreign-market 
institutions. Nevertheless, as some of the respondents emphasized, it is difficult to transfer 
knowledge from the home market to the foreign market because of their different institutional 
logics. This implies that previous experience can be of little relevance because of the 
peculiarities of the foreign market (Meyer & Gelbuda 2006). Further, I did not consider that the 
case companies entered the foreign market at various times. It may be that those managers 
entering the foreign market in an early time are better at handling ambiguities and dissonance. 
The scope of this study was limited to including four companies as illustrative examples. 
However, a larger sample of case companies could provide greater insight as it would represent 
a larger group of subjective interpretations to this phenomenon, making an even larger sample 
for investigating similarities and differences in their approach to learning from social capital. 
Finally, since internationalization to an institutionally distant market implies that managers are 
challenging their conventional wisdom about appropriate behavior and decisions, investment in 
the cognitive dimension of social capital is fundamentally difficult. A new direction to the 
cognitive dimension of social capital could be to incorporate absorptive capacity into this 
construct, as it deals with how managers enact on knowledge for commercial ends (Cohen & 
Levinthal 1990; Shaker, Zahra, & George 2002). Absorptive capacity has already been studied 
in the field of international business (Collins & Hitt 2006; Lane, Koka, & Pathak 2006; Lane, 
Salk, & Lyles 2001; Lyles & Salk 2010) and could enrich an understanding of the cognitive 
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